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Abstract
Most economic decisions involve judgments. When decisions are
taken collectively, various judgment aggregation problems may oc-
cur. Here we consider an aggregation problem called the ￿ discursive
dilemma￿ , which is characterized by an inconsistency between the ag-
gregate judgment on the premises for a conclusion and the aggregate
judgment on the conclusion itself. It thus matter for the decision
whether the group uses a premise- or a conclusion-based decision-
making procedure. The current literature, primarily within jurispru-
dence, philosophy, and social choice, consider aggregation of qualita-
tive judgments on propositions. Most economic decisions, however,
involve quantitative judgments on economic variables. We develop
a framework that is suitable for analyzing the relevance of the dis-
cursive dilemma for economic decisions. Assuming that decisions are
reached either through majority voting or by averaging, we ￿nd that
the dilemma cannot be ruled out, except under some restrictive as-
sumptions about the relationship between the premise-variables and
the conclusion.
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11 Introduction
Many economic decisions are made by groups rather than individuals. Gov-
ernments decide ￿scal policies, monetary policy committees set interest
rates, corporate boards make investment decisions, and families choose their
mortgage. Like most other economic decisions, collective decisions are often
based on imperfect information and must rely on judgments. For example,
interest rate decisions rely on judgments about in￿ ationary pressures and ￿-
nancial fragility, corporate investment decisions rely on judgments of future
cash ￿ ows and cost of capital, and so on.
Aggregating individual judgments to a ￿ group judgment￿is not straight
forward. Recent research, primarily within jurisprudence, philosophy, and
social choice, shows that group judgments may be subject to a ￿ discursive
dilemma￿ , see e.g. Dietrich (2003) and List (2004a).1 The dilemma can
be illustrated by the following (￿ctitious) example: Suppose that George
Bush, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld came together some day in 2002
to decide whether the US should invade Iraq. They agreed that the premises
for an invasion are that the following two propositions were judged true: (i)
Iraq hides weapons of mass destruction, and (ii) the war can be won with
￿ acceptable￿military losses. This logical link between the judgments on (i)
and (ii) and the conclusion is denoted the rule of inference. Suppose the
individual judgments were as in Table 1.
Table 1
Weapons of Acceptable
mass destruction? losses? Invasion?
Bush Yes No No
Powell No Yes No
Rumsfeld Yes Yes Yes
Majority Yes Yes No
As the bottom row shows, the group￿ s aggregate conclusion (No) is in-
consistent with its aggregate judgments on the propositions (Yes, Yes) and
the rule of inference. This inconsistency makes the group￿ s decision depend,
not only on the policymakers￿judgments and aggregation method (majority,
consensus etc.), but also on its decision procedure. A premise-based deci-
sion procedure is a procedure where the policymakers vote on (i) and (ii)
separately, and then let the rule of inference dictate the conclusion. If the
group used this procedure there would be an invasion. If they instead used
a conclusion-based procedure, and voted directly on the conclusion, there
would not be an invasion.
The existing literature on the discursive dilemma only looks at binary
judgment aggregation. The aggregation is binary because the premises and
1It is also known as the ￿ doctrinal paradox￿ .
2the conclusion are yes/no judgments on propositions, as in the example
above. Such aggregation of yes/no judgments is relevant for many types
of decisions in groups. However, most economic decisions are not binary.
Rather, the typical economic decision-making problem is to ￿nd the correct
or optimal level of a continuous variable. Furthermore, the premises for the
conclusion are typically judgments on continuous variables. Generally, the
rule of inference for many economic decisions may be written as
c = f(p1;p2;:::;pk); (1)
where c is a continuous conclusion variable (e.g., the interest rate, the tax
rate, the level of investments, etc.), p1;p2;:::;pk are continuous premise vari-
ables, i.e., the information set on which the economic decision is based, and
f(￿) is some function. The following example illustrates that there are dis-
cursive dilemmas also in this case. Consider a group of three policymakers
who decide on the size of a policy variable c, the ￿ conclusion variable￿ . They
all agree that c should depend on the judgment on one premise variable p,
and the ￿ rule of inference￿f (p) = p2. Suppose the individual judgments are
as in Table 2, and that the aggregation method is majority voting, where
the outcome of a vote on a variable is the median judgment on that variable.
Table 2
p c = p2 c
Individual 1 ￿1 Agree 1
Individual 2 0 Agree 0
Individual 3 1 Agree 1
Median 0 Agree 1
As the ￿rst three rows show, the individual conclusions are consistent
with the judgments on the premise variable and the rule of inference. How-
ever, the aggregate judgments are not consistent, since 02 6= 1 (bottom row
of Table 2). Furthermore, and as a consequence of this inconsistency, a di-
rect vote on the conclusion gives c = 1, while separate vote on p and the
rule of inference gives c = 0.
Any ￿nite set of judgments on variables can be translated into judgments
on a set of propositions.2 Thus, both the example above ￿and any other
￿nite set of judgments ￿can be translated into the binary model. However,
as we show in the paper, for decisions that can be represented by (1), the
existence of the discursive dilemma depends crucially on the functional form
of f(￿). The binary framework does not make the functional form of f(￿)
2Any ordering ￿ on a set of mutually exclusive judgments, fp
0;p
00;p
000g can always be






000g, where ￿ ￿￿
means "closer to truth".
3explicit.3 The binary framework is therefore not well suited for analyzing
the discursive dilemma when the premises and the conclusion are judgments
on variables. Furthermore, economic decisions are usually modelled as in
equation (1). Having to translate these models into a binary framework
is both cumbersome and ine¢ cient. For these reasons, we develop a model
where conditions for the existence of the discursive dilemma can be analyzed
directly. Assuming that decisions are reached either through majority voting
or by averaging, we ￿nd that the dilemma cannot be ruled out, except under
some restrictive assumptions about the rule of inference. Even if we for
mathematical convenience focus on continuous variables, the results hold
also when the variables are many-valued but discrete.
Although our approach is new, it builds on the literature on binary judg-
ment aggregation. This literature focus on the possibility of consistent judg-
ment aggregation under various conditions. List and Pettit (2002) and List
and Pettit (2004) developed a ￿rst model of judgment aggregation based
on propositional logic and proved an impossibility result. This has later
been followed by several stronger impossibility results (Pauly and van Hees
(2003); Dietrich (2003); G￿rdenfors (2004); van Hees (2004); Nehring and
Puppe (2005); Dietrich and List (2005a)) and possibility results (Bovens and
Rabinowicz (2004); Dietrich (2003); List (2003), List (2004a), List (2004b);
Pigozzi (2004)). Generalizing this approach, Dietrich (2004) has developed
a model of judgment aggregation in general logics, which allows the repre-
sentation of a larger class of aggregation problems.4
The impossibility results of the existing literature states that there is no
non-dictatorial aggregation method that generally produces consistent col-
lective judgments on interconnected propositions and satis￿es some minimal
conditions. Since, as mentioned above, a ￿nite set of judgments on contin-
uous variables can be translated into judgments on a set of interconnected
propositions, the impossibility results apply also to the continuous variables
case. However, with judgments on variables that can take more than two
values, inconsistent collective judgments is a necessary, but not a su¢ cient
condition for a discursive dilemma (see Section 4). What is interesting for
economic policy is the cases when the inconsistent collective judgments im-
ply that the decision depends on the decision procedure. Our framework
enables us to focus on the discursive dilemma only, and not inconsistent
collective judgments in general.
It should be noted that judgment aggregation, as studied here, is di⁄er-
ent from the more traditional discipline of social choice, which was sparked
o⁄ by Arrow￿ s seminal work (Arrow (1951/1963)). Traditional social choice
concerns the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings over
3In the binary framework the functional form is hidden in a set of propositions of the
type ￿ if p = p
0 then c = c
0￿ .
4Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) give an impossibility result for the aggregation of
probablility assesments and utilities.
4several alternatives into an aggregate preference ordering over these alter-
natives. Applied to our judgment aggregation setting, this concerns the
problem of aggregating individual orderings on alternative judgments on
one variable into a corresponding aggregate ordering over the judgments on
this variable. In table 2, for example, traditional social choice would con-
cern the problem of aggregating the three individuals￿orderings over the
three judgments on one variable (p or c) into a collective judgment on the
same variable. In contrast, the type of judgment aggregation we study con-
cerns the consistency between judgments on di⁄erent variables, i.e. between
judgments on the premise variables and the judgments on the conclusion (de-
cision) variable. List and Pettit (2004) discuss the relation between Arrows
impossibility theorem and the impossibility results on judgment aggrega-
tion. Dietrich and List (2005b) prove that that Arrow￿ s theorem is a direct
corollary of a more general result on judgment aggregation.
In Section 2, we introduce the analytical framework and present the gen-
eral results. We present some applications of our results to speci￿c economic
decisions in Section 3, and provide a discussion of the assumptions. Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Analytical framework
2.1 Model
Consider a group where N denotes the set of members and where jNj = n
is odd, ￿nite and greater than 1. The group, which could be a government,
a monetary policy committee, a corporate board, an expert panel, etc., has
to make a conclusion on the size of a policy parameter c 2 R. The policy
parameter could be the level of a tax or a tari⁄, the interest rate, the optimal
size of a plant, etc.
The members of the group agree that their conclusion should depend
on the judgments on k premise variables p1;p2;:::;pk. Each member i 2
N has a separate judgment pij on each premise variable pj where j 2 J,
J = (1;2;:::;k). The set of possible judgments on all premise variables is a
Cartesian product of possible judgments for each premise variable. Formally,









where J = (1;2;:::;k) and p￿
j < p+




Individual i￿ s vector of judgments is denoted pi = (pi1;pi2;:::;pik),
where pi 2 Q. The sets of premise and conclusion judgments for the whole
group are denoted P = fpigi2N and C = fcigi2N, respectively. We think of
P and C as the judgments that exist after the members of the group have
shared the information they possess.
5A ￿ rule of inference￿establishes the logical link between judgments on
the premise variables and the conclusion. The rule may, for example, be
an explicit formula like c = p2 in Table 2, or the Taylor rule in monetary
policy (c.f. Sect. 3). It can also be a more complicated economic model,
or an approximation of essential facets of the group￿ s thinking about how
premises and the conclusion are logically linked.
De￿nition 1 A rule of inference f (p) is a continuously di⁄erentiable func-
tion that for each set of judgments p = (p1;p2;:::;pk) 2 Q and for each i 2 N
speci￿es a conclusion c:
c = f : Q ! R
We abstract from judgment aggregation problems that arise because the
individuals have di⁄erent rules of inference. Hence,
Assumption 2 The individuals have the same rule of inference c = f (p)
In line with most of the literature on binary judgment aggregation, we
abstract from strategic behavior. The individuals are assumed to report
their true judgments.
Assumption 3 Sincere behavior. All members of N always report their
true judgments and reveal all relevant information they possess.5







and the aggregate judgment on the conclusion cA. Then, if the group ag-
gregates the conclusion directly, for example by voting directly on the con-
clusion, the aggregate conclusion is cA. Call such a decision procedure a
conclusion-based decision-making procedure (CBP). If the group aggregates
the judgments on the premise variables and uses the rule of inference to gen-
erate a conclusion, the aggregate conclusion (decision) is f
￿
pA￿
. Call such a
decision procedure a premise-based decision procedure (PBP). We say there
is a ￿ discursive dilemma￿if the CBP gives a di⁄erent decision (conclusion)
than the PBP. Hence,
De￿nition 2 There is a discursive dilemma if cA 6= f
￿
pA￿
Generally, groups may aggregate their judgments in many ways. The
existing literature on the discursive dilemma focusses on voting. Recently,
the literature on monetary policy committees has also considered ￿ averaging￿
5Assumption 3 and our interpretation of P and C as the set of judgments that exists
after the members of the group have shared all relevant information, imply that for pi 6= pj
for some i;j 2 N, there have to be (i) some imperfections in the information transmission
within the group, or (ii) di⁄erences between the individuals that make them form di⁄erent
judgments for the same set of information.
6as an aggregation procedure, where the group￿ s aggregate judgment is the
average of the individual judgments, see Munnich et.al. (1999), Blinder and
Morgan (2000), and Gerlach-Kristen (2003), and therefore we analyze this
type of judgment aggregation in addition to majority voting. Note also that
under certain assumptions, decisions based on consensus can be expressed
as an average of the initial judgments, see DeGroot (1974), Chatterjee and
Seneta (1977), and Berger (1981).
To model majority voting, we assume that the individuals￿ordering on
the judgments on each variable pj, j 2 J, and the ordering on the conclusion
c, are single-peaked. Denote the median judgments on premise j for pm
j , and
the median judgment on the conclusion cm. With single-peaked orderings,
pm
j will beat any other judgment in a pair-wise vote over the judgments on
pj. Similarly cm will beat any other alternative in a pair-wise vote over the
judgments on c. Hence, if majority voting is used to aggregate judgments,
the aggregate judgments are given by pm = (pm
1 ;pm
2 ;:::;pm
k ) and cm.
Under averaging, the vector of aggregate judgments on the premises and



















2.2.1 Majority voting and k = 1
We start by looking at the simpler situation where k = 1. Let ￿(pi) be
the numerical position of pi 2 P when the elements of P are arranged
in an increasing order. Similarly, let ￿(ci) be the numerical position of
ci 2 C when the elements of C are arranged in increasing order. A necessary
condition for a dilemma under majority voting is that ￿(pi) 6= ￿(ci) for some
q and s 2 N where pq 6= ps. The necessary condition can only be ful￿lled if
f (p) is non-monotonic on Q. If not, ￿(ci) is determined entirely by ￿(pi).
Generally, when k = 1, the numerical position of an element ci 2 C depends
on two factors: (i) the numerical position of pi 2 P, and (ii) the functional
form of the rule of inference. Thus:
Proposition 1 If N aggregates judgments by majority voting and k = 1,
then
(i) cm = f (pm) for all P ￿ Q if f(p) is monotonic for p 2 Q,
(ii) there exists a P ￿ Q such that cm 6= f (pm) if f(p) is non-monotonic
for p 2 Q.
Proof. As indicated before the proposition.
Proposition 1 states that if the group aggregates judgments by majority
voting, a discursive dilemma cannot be ruled out if the rule of inference is
non-monotonic on its domain. It can only be ruled out if the rule of inference
is monotonic in its domain.
7A general proposition for when there will be a dilemma does not exist,
since the existence of a dilemma depends both on the functional form of
the rule of inference and the particular set of judgments. With assumptions
1￿ 3 there always exist sets of judgments (P) where all elements are in the
monotonic parts of a rule. Furthermore, even if the set of judgments covers
also the non-monotonic part of the rule, there may still be a set of judg-
ments that generates a linear relationship between the judgments and the
conclusion.6 However, for non-monotonic rules with only one local maxi-
mum or minimum we can reach a stronger conclusion. Let pmax ￿ maxP
and pmin ￿ minP, and p￿ ￿ argmaxf (p) if f (p) is non-monotonic with
one local maximum, and p￿ ￿ argmax￿f (p) if f (p) is non-monotonic with
one local minimum. Call the set of judgments P dispersed if it has elements
in both the increasing and decreasing parts of the rule of inference, i.e.
De￿nition 3 The set of judgments P is dispersed if pmin < p￿, and pmax >
p￿.
We then have the following result.
Corollary 1 If N aggregates judgments by majority voting, k = 1, and f(p)
has either one local maximum or one local minimum, then there will be a
discursive dilemma i⁄ P is dispersed and
(a) f(p) has one local maximum and f(pmax) < f (pm) and f(pmin) <
f (pm), or
(b) f(p) has one local minimum and f(pmax) > f (pm) and f(pmin) >
f (pm).
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1 provides su¢ cient conditions for a dilemma. The corollary
says that in order for there to be a dilemma, there must be judgments on
both the increasing and decreasing parts of the rule. Furthermore, if the
rule of inference has one local maximum, the highest and lowest judgments
on the premise variable must imply a lower conclusion than the one that
follows from the median judgment. Similarly, if the rule of inference has one
local minimum, the highest and lowest judgments on the premise variable
must imply a higher conclusion than the one that follows from the median
judgment.
We may also analyze the way that the decision is skewed, depending on
which decision procedure is used.
Corollary 2 If N aggregates judgments by majority voting, k = 1, and f(p)
has either one local maximum or one local minimum, then
(a) cm 6 f (pm) if f(p) is non-monotonic with one local maximum, and
(b) cm > f (pm) if f(p) is non-monotonic with one local minimum.
6For example, k = 1, n = 3, Q = R, f (p) = sinp, and P = (￿￿;0;￿)
8Proof. See proof of Corollary 1 in Appendix.
Corollary 2 says that the CBP tends to yield a lower (higher) c than the
PBP when f (p) is concave (convex).
2.2.2 Majority voting and k > 1
If k > 1, the numerical position of an element ci 2 C depends on the shape
of the rule of inference and the numerical position of the judgments on two
di⁄erent premise variables. A simple example where f (p) = p1 +p2, n = 3,
P = f(2;3);(4;1);(1;2)g shows that with k > 1, a linear rule of inference
does not rule out a dilemma. Our second proposition generalizes this insight.
Proposition 2 If N aggregates judgments by a simple majority rule, and
k > 1, then there exists a P ￿ Q such that cm 6= f (pm).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 states that if the group aggregates judgments by major-
ity voting, and there is more than one premise variable, then a discursive
dilemma cannot be ruled out.
As in the case when k = 1, it is not possible to specify a general theorem
for when there will be a dilemma. Nor do there exist speci￿c functional
forms f (p) for which there will never be a dilemma.
2.2.3 Averaging
If the rule of inference is linear, there can never be a dilemma under averaging
since then cavg = f (pavg) for any p. If f (p) is strictly concave or convex and
k = 1 there must be a dilemma if the individuals have di⁄erent judgments
on the premise variable (which also follows from Jensen￿ s inequality). Thus,
if k = 1 and the rule of inference is non-linear on Q, then there exist sets
of judgments with a discursive dilemma. Our third proposition generalizes
this result.
Proposition 3 If N aggregates judgments by averaging, then
(i) cavg = f (pavg) for all P ￿ Q if f(p) is a linear function for all p 2
Q,
(ii) there exists a P ￿ Q such that cavg 6= f (pavg) if f(p) is a non-linear
function for some p 2 Q.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that if the group aggregates judgments by averaging,
a discursive dilemma cannot be ruled out if the rule of inference is non-linear
on its domain. It can be ruled out if the rule of inference is a linear function.
If the rule of inference is strictly concave or convex we can make two
corollaries. The ￿rst regards a situation that may very well prevail.
9Corollary 3 If N aggregates judgments by averaging, k = 1, f (p) is strictly
concave or convex for p 2 Q, and pi 6= ps and i, s 2 N, then cavg 6= f (pavg).
Proof. Jensen￿ s inequality
Corollary 3 says that with averaging there will always be a dilemma if at
least two individuals have di⁄erent judgments on the same premise variable,
and the rule is strictly concave or convex.
The second corollary regards how the decision will be skewed depending
on the decision procedure.
Corollary 4 If N aggregates judgments by averaging and k = 1, then cavg ￿
f (pavg) when f(p) is strictly concave in Q, and cavg ￿ f (pavg) when f(p)
is strictly convex in Q.
Proof. Jensen￿ s inequality
The corollary says that the CBP tends to give a lower(higher) c than the
PBP when the rule of inference is strictly concave(convex).
3 Applications
3.1 Linear rules of inference
Monetary policy decisions are usually taken by a group, often called a mon-
etary policy committee (MPC), and involve judgments on many variables.
It has become popular to specify interest rate decisions in terms of an
￿ interest rate rule￿ , for example a Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)). Suppose that
all the members of the MPC specify their interest rate proposals according
to the following (classic) Taylor rule
it = r￿
t + ￿￿ + a(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + byt; (2)
where it is the nominal interest rate in period t, r￿
t is the neutral/natural
real interest rate, which is assumed to vary over time, ￿￿ is the desired rate
of in￿ ation (in￿ ation target), ￿t is actual in￿ ation, and yt is the output gap.
In practice, the neutral real interest rate r￿
t and the output gap yt cannot be
observed and are subject to judgment. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that the MPC members will, to some extent, disagree on the estimates of
these variables. We assume that ￿t can be observed perfectly, and with
no loss of generality we consider a situation where in￿ ation is equal to the
target, i.e. ￿t = ￿￿ = 2. Moreover, we set b = 0:5 as in Taylor￿ s (1993)
classic speci￿cation. In order to keep the example as simple as possible,
suppose the MCP consists of three members. Members each have their own
estimates of r￿




Member 1 2:1 2:6 5:4
Member 2 3:0 1:0 5:5
Member 3 2:2 1:2 4:8
In voting, the possibility of a dilemma can never be excluded, c.f. Propo-
sition 2. From Table 3 we see that im
t = 5:4, while r￿m
t +2+0:5ym
t = 4:8, and
the discursive dilemma therefore applies in the example. With averaging,
there will never be a dilemma when the rule is linear, c.f. proposition 3. In
the example in table 3 we have i
avg
t = 5:2 and r
￿avg
t + 2 + 0:5y
avg
t = 5:2.
3.2 Non-linear rules of inference
One type of premise variable that typically yields a non-linear rule of infer-
ence is the e⁄ects of the policy instrument. When deciding the appropriate
level of the policy instrument, one has to take into account how the in-
strument a⁄ects the target variable(s). In many situations there will be
disagreement about the exact e⁄ects of the policy instrument.
The di⁄erence between linear and non-linear rules of inference has its
counterpart in the di⁄erence between additive and multiplicative uncer-
tainty. Di⁄erences in individual judgments are caused by uncertainty, and
it is natural to relate judgment aggregation problems to the literature on
policymaking under uncertainty. We will therefore illustrate the discursive
dilemma within the framework of the classic model by Brainard (1967).
Suppose that the relationship between the target variable y and the policy
instrument z is given by
y = ￿z + x; (3)
where x represents exogenous variables that a⁄ect the policymakers￿tar-
get variable. Equation (3) may represent a wide range of policy e⁄ects,
for example, the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the e⁄ect of un-
employment bene￿ts on equilibrium unemployment, the e⁄ect of tari⁄s on
the trade balance, the e⁄ect of ￿scal expenditures on GDP, and so on. In
many theoretical models, one can log-linearize the reduced form and yield
an expression equivalent to (3).
We assume that ￿ cannot be observed by the policymakers and is per-
ceived as stochastic. Committee members each have their own estimate/judgment
of ￿, denoted ￿i, i = 1;::;n: For simplicity, we assume that each committee
member perceives ￿ to be equally uncertain, represented by the variance ￿2
￿,
which therefore has no subscript for committee member. The policymakers￿
objective is to set the policy instrument such that the target variable y is
brought as close as possible to the target level y￿. The objective function is
quadratic and given by
11U = ￿(y ￿ y￿)2: (4)
Due to uncertainty about ￿, the committee seeks to maximize E(U) with
respect to z. Member i￿ s policy proposal is based on maximizing Ei(U),
where Ei is the expectations operator based on member i￿ s estimate of ￿.
Straight-forward optimization gives the following level for the policy instru-






(y￿ ￿ x): (5)
We will denote ￿i
￿2
i+￿2
￿ the ￿ policy response coe¢ cient￿ , as it says how strongly
the policy instrument responds to the exogenous variables. Without loss of







Figure 1 shows the shape of the policy response coe¢ cient when ￿ > 0.7




Consider ￿rst voting. We have from Proposition 1 that with one premise
variable, one cannot exclude a dilemma if the rule of inference is non-
monotonic. Thus, a discursive dilemma cannot be ruled out if ￿ can take
7The ￿gure for ￿ < 0 is the mirror image.
12values on both the increasing and decreasing part of f (￿). Whether there ac-
tually will be a dilemma depends on the distribution of estimates/judgments.
According to Corollary 1, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the dilemma
when the rule of inference is given by (6) is
f(￿m) > f(￿min) and f(￿m) > f(￿max)
If the discursive dilemma applies, a conclusion-based decision procedure
will always give rise to a more cautious policy response than a premise-
based procedure (corollary 2). An extreme case is when the distribution of
estimates is such that f0(￿m) = 0. In that case the premise-based decision
procedure will give a policy response that is based on the most extreme
value of the members￿response coe¢ cients.
Consider next averaging, and note that the rule of inference is single-
peaked and globally non-linear. It thus satis￿es the conditions in Corol-
lary 3, so that decisions based on averaging will generally yield a discursive
dilemma. An important question is whether a premise-based procedure
would result in a more or a less cautious policy (in addition to the cautious-
ness due to multiplicative uncertainty). From Corollary 4, we know that
a premise-based procedure would give a weaker policy response if the rule
of inference is strictly concave in ￿i, while it will give a stronger policy re-
sponse if it is strictly convex. We know that the rule of inference is strictly
concave when 0 < ￿i <
p
3￿ and strictly convex when ￿i >
p
3￿. The sign
of the discursive dilemma is therefore ambiguous. However, the higher the
degree of uncertainty relative to the point estimate, the more likely it is that
the conclusion-based procedure will yield a weaker policy response than a
premise-based procedure.
4 Discussion
We have assumed that the premises are continuous variables (Assumption
1). This assumption is not necessary for our results, but is convenient as
it rules out particular combinations of Q and f (p) for which there will
never be a dilemma.8 It is easy to construct examples with a dilemma even
if premises and conclusions are not continuous variables.9 As long as the
premise variables are not perfectly correlated our results also hold true if
the domain is more restricted than a Cartesian product (Assumption 1).
Assumption 2, that all individuals have the same rule of inference, may
seem very restrictive. However, it does not mean that the individuals have
to agree on a speci￿c policy rule (e.g., a Taylor rule). f (p) represents
what all members of the group can subscribe to. For example, consider the
following ￿ policy rule￿ : c = ￿x, where c is the decision variable (e.g., the
8Example: p(x) = ax1 + bsinx2, and Q := fx1 2 R; x2 = ￿2￿;0;2￿g
9Example: p(x) = x1 + x2, Q := fx1 2 1;2;3;x2 2 1;2;3g.
13central bank￿ s key interest rate), x is an economic variable (e.g., the rate of
underlying in￿ ation), and ￿ is a parameter that says how much a change in
x should a⁄ect c. If the individuals disagree on both x and ￿, the rule of
inference has two premise variables; x and ￿. One may easily generalize this
example to show that each individual may have a di⁄erent policy rule for
their decisions ￿even policy rules with di⁄erent right-hand side variables
and functional forms ￿ but yet it will be possible to formulate a rule of
inference that all agree on.
We have also assumed that the individuals report their true judgments
(Assumption 3). Our results hinge on this assumption. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that k = 1, f (p) is non-monotonic with one local maximum and n = 3.
Then, if the decision procedure is majority voting, the individual with the
median conclusion judgment (cm) can always report a false premise judg-
ment so that the conclusion under a premise-based decision procedure will
be cm (c.f. ￿gure 1). If the decision procedure is averaging, each member can
report a judgement that a⁄ects the average judgement so that it coincides
with her own true judgement. Consequently there is no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.10 However, there are good reasons for making Assumption 3.
The ￿rst is methodological. In order to analyze strategic behavior, one must
￿rst understand the equilibria without strategic behavior. Second, sincere
behavior is a reasonable assumption for expert panels and policy commit-
tees like (some) MPCs. Such groups are supposed to pool information and
judgment, not to aggregate preferences. The members of such groups are
supposed not to let their preferences over outcomes in￿ uence their behavior.
There already exist impossibility theorems for the aggregation of judg-
ments on interconnected propositions (binary decisions), c.f. the introduc-
tion. Since judgments on variables that can take many values can be mir-
rored in a set of judgments on interconnected propositions, our exercise may
therefore seem super￿ uous. However, with judgments on variables that can
take more than two values, inconsistent collective judgments is only a nec-
essary, and not a su¢ cient condition for a discursive dilemma. A simple
example prove this.
Suppose k = 1, N = fA;B;Cg and f (p) = p. Let P = (pA;pB;pC),
and the ordering on this set of judgments be
A : pA ￿ pB ￿ pC,
B : pB ￿ pC ￿ pA,
C : pC ￿ pB ￿ pA.
It follows that pm = pB, and cm = cB. Thus, there is no discursive
dilemma as we have de￿ned it (c.f. de￿nition 2).
10List (2004c) discusses strategic voting in the aggregation of judgments on intercon-
nected propositions (the binary case), and notes that if all individuals act strategically
under majority voting, a (formal) premise-based procedure will give a decision that is
identical to that of a conclusion-based procedure.
14Now, let the propositions ￿1, ￿2 be de￿ned as ￿1 : pB ￿ pA and ￿2 : pB ￿
pC. Let ￿3 be the proposition that ￿1and ￿2 are true: (￿3 $ ￿1 ^ ￿2). We
can then summarize the individuals￿judgments on these propositions as in
the three ￿rst rows of Table 4.
Table 4
￿1 ￿2 ￿3
Individual A No Yes No
Individual B Yes Yes Yes
Individual C Yes No No
Majority Yes Yes No
The collective judgments are clearly inconsistent (bottom row). Thus,
in the example there are inconsistent collective judgments, but no discursive
dilemma.
The interesting cases for economic policy, are the cases when the in-
consistent collective judgments imply a discursive dilemma. We therefore
develop a framework that enables us to focus on the discursive dilemma
only, and not inconsistent collective judgments in general.
5 Summing up
In this paper we have developed a model to study an inconsistency that may
arise when individual judgments on a set of continuous premise variables
and a continuous conclusion variable are aggregated into group judgments
on these variables. We have looked at two aggregation methods: majority
voting and averaging. We have shown that in both cases the group￿ s conclu-
sion is prone to be inconsistent with the collective judgments on the premise
variables. This inconsistency arises even though each individual have con-
sistent judgments. The aggregate inconsistency makes the decision depend
on the group￿ s decision procedure: a conclusion-based decision procedure,
where the group aggregates the conclusion directly, gives another decision
than a premise-based decision procedure, where the group ￿rst aggregates
the judgments on the premise variables and then lets these aggregate judg-
ments dictate the decision. We ￿nd that the possibility of an inconsistency
depends on the combination of two factors: (i) the functional form of a ￿ rule
of inference￿ , which represents the logical link between the conclusion and
the judgments on premise variables, and (ii) the set of possible judgments
on the conclusion variable and the premise variables.
Although we are particularly interested in collective economic decisions,
our ￿ndings are relevant for many other collective decisions. A team of
doctors deciding how much of a drug to give a patient, juries deciding the
duration of a prison sentences, etc. will face aggregation problems. Their
decision may depend on the decision procedure. Generally, the results apply
15to any collective decision that depends on the judgments on a set of premise
variables.
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17Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1
Let P<m := fp 2 P j p < pmg and P>m := fp 2 P j p > pmg
Part (a):
Step 1:
Suppose f(pmax) > f (pm). Then pm < p￿. Consequently f(p) < f(pm)
for p 2 P<m and f(p) > f(pm) for p 2 P>m which implies that cm = f(pm).
Suppose f(pmin) > f (pm). Then pm > p￿. Consequently f(p) < f(pm)
for p 2 P>m and f(p) > f(pm) for p 2 P<m which implies that cm = f(pm).
Suppose f(pmax) < f (pm) and f(pmin) < f (pm). Then f(p) < f(pm)
for p 2 P<m and Pmax, or f(p) < f(pm) for p 2 P>m and Pmin which imply
that cm < f(pm).
Step 2:
Suppose f(pmax) = f (pm). If f(pmax) = f (pm) because pm = pmax,
then cm = f(pm). If f(pmax) = f (pm) and pm 6= pmax, then f (p) < f (pm)
for p 2 P<m and f (p) ￿ f (pm) for p 2 P>m, and consequently cm = f(pm).
The proof for f(pmin) = f (pm) =) cm = f(pm) is parallel.
Part (b): Parallels the proof of (a).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume that k = 2, i.e. c = f(p1;p2). Let (p0
1;p0
2) 2 Q be judgments on
the premise variables such that f(p0
1;p0
2) = c0, and (p00
1;p00
2) 2 Q be judgments










Suppose n = 3, and p1 = (p0
11;p0
12), p2 = (p0
21;p00
22), p3 = (p00
31;p0
32).
Then pm = (p0
1;p0
2), and it follows from (7) that cm > f (pm) and there is a
discursive dilemma. Under assumption 1 judgments that ful￿lls (7) always
exist. Thus proposition 1 for the case when n = 3, and k = 2.
If k = 2 and n > 3, there always exist ￿under assumption 1 ￿sets of
judgments that ful￿lls criteria similar to (7).
If k > 2, there will be a dilemma when the members of the committee
agree on all premise variables except for two where the judgments ful￿ll (7).
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part (i): Property of linear functions.
Part (ii): Let P0 := fP 2 Q j pij = pzj for i;z 2 N and j 2 Jnfsgg. Then,
since f (p) is a non-linear function for ps 2 Q, there exists a set of judgments
P 2 P0 where pis 6= pzs such that cavg 6= f (pavg) (Jensen￿ s inequality).
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